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23 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Contact with Mr. David Young, Formerly of White House Staff

1. The undersigned had one personal contact with Mr. Young, which occurred on Saturday morning, 16 September 1972. The meeting lasted about 30 minutes (roughly from 12:00 noon to 12:30 P.M. on that date) and took place in the following circumstances.

25X1A9a (a) On that Saturday morning, the DCI Duty Officer was
[redacted] Sometime before 12:00 noon [redacted] 25X1A9a
received a telephone call from Mr. Young during which the latter
complained about an alleged "security leak" to the press from either
the Central Intelligence Agency or the Defense Intelligence Agency.
Specifically, Mr. Young referred to a Dan Rather (CBS) broadcast
of 15 September which allegedly contained a whole series of leaks --
including a report that both the CIA and the DIA had informed the
President that the bombing and mining campaign against North Vietnam
had not cut off Hanoi's supply lines to its forces in the south.
Dan Rather, in his broadcast, attributed part of his information
to an earlier story by Tad Szulc of the New York Times. (A transcript
of the Dan Rather broadcast is attached at TAB A.)

25X1A9a (b) The above description of this telephone call was given
to me orally by [redacted] after the fact. [redacted] also told me 25X1A9a
that in the same telephone call Mr. Young had requested a complete
list of all individuals, by name, who had access to any of our
25X1A9a reports which might have been the basis of this leak. Mr. Young
further informed [redacted] that he was going to come out to the
CIA building in Langley to talk to [redacted] and asked [redacted] 25X1A9a
to have the requested information ready for him. 25X1A9a

25X1A9a (c) After having finished his telephone conversation with
Mr. Young, [redacted] called Mr. Edward Proctor, who was on duty in
the office of the DDI that Saturday. Mr. Proctor, in turn, called
the undersigned, who was the SAVA Duty Officer, and asked the undersigned
to determine what CIA report or reports might have provided the
information in the alleged leak, and who had received copies of
any such report or reports.

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(d) The requested information was readily available, and I took it to Mr. Proctor's office. He and I both proceeded directly to [REDACTED] who was sitting in the Director's office. At that point I explained to [REDACTED] that the Dan Rather broadcast was based in part on an earlier Tad Szulc article, and that we had already sent a memorandum to the Director (and to the Director of Security) in which we described three Agency reports from which the Tad Szulc leak might have come. I gave a copy of this memorandum to Mr.

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[REDACTED] and told him that the same three Agency reports were also the only ones from which the Dan Rather "leak" could have come. This memorandum from SAVA to the Director also listed all individuals outside the Agency who had received copies of the three reports. After reading the memorandum and discussing it briefly with me, [REDACTED] asked me to remain with him and participate in the discussion with Mr. Young, and I agreed. Mr. Proctor then returned to his own office, and to the best of my knowledge was not further involved in the incident. (Attached at TAB B is a copy of the SAVA memorandum to the Director described above. Also at TAB B are a copy of the buckslip under which the memorandum was sent to the Director of Security, and a copy of the New York Times article by Tad Szulc.)

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(e) Mr. Young arrived shortly thereafter. [REDACTED] and I explained to him that the Agency had already made a thorough check of its reporting in view of the possibility of a "leak" in the earlier Tad Szulc article, and that Dan Rather by his own statement had obtained the information which he had attributed to CIA from the Szulc article. We then allowed Mr. Young to read the SAVA memorandum to the Director which is attached at TAB B. My recollection is that Mr. Young took notes from this memorandum, but that he did not take a copy away with him. I am not, however, certain that my memory is correct on this point.

(f) Mr. Young then requested that we provide him with the names of all individuals within the Agency who had worked on or had access to any of the three reports described in the SAVA memorandum to the Director. [REDACTED] was reluctant to provide such a list, and for several minutes there was an exchange between him and Mr. Young on the propriety of our providing a list of analysts' names. Finally we compromised and gave Mr. Young the names of the heads of the offices within CIA which had been involved

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in preparing the reports. To the best of my recollection, the names which we provided were:

25X1A9a Mr. Edward Proctor
Mr. Paul Walsh
Mr. Richard Lehman
Mr. John Huizenga
Mr. Maurice Ernst

My own name, of course, was also given to Mr. Young. Mr. Young then indicated that he might contact the Director on the following Monday in an effort to obtain more names. The meeting ended amicably at that point, and Mr. Young departed.

25X1A9a (g) The following day, 17 September 1972, [REDACTED] wrote a very brief note concerning this incident to [REDACTED] and the undersigned. In this note (see TAB C) [REDACTED] indicated that he was going to discuss the incident with the Director on Monday, 18 September. I do not know whether he did or did not do so. I also do not know whether Mr. Young ever contacted any Agency representative again on this subject.

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2. I have had no other contacts, before or since, with Mr. David Young.

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[REDACTED]

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LDX CIA

WANTED YOU TO SEE THE ATTACHED REPORT. SOME OF THIS
NONSENSE WILL NO DOUBT BE AWAITING YOU IN THE PRESS BRIEFING / -25X1A9a
SATURDAY.

ATTACHMENT

FIRST LINE REPORT - WTOP
WITH DAN RATHER
SEPTEMBER 15, 1972 *Friday*
7:40 AM EDT

DAN RATHER: FIRST LINE REPORT, NEWS AND ANALYSIS.
DAN RATHER, CBS NEWS, THE WHITE HOUSE. GOOD MORNING.

QUESTIONS OF TRADE, AND IS HANOI BEATING THE BOMBING?
A TRY AT SOME ANALYTICAL THOUGHTS AFTER THIS.
(ANNOUNCEMENT)

DAN RATHER: IT NOW CAN BE REPORTED AUTHORITATIVELY
THAT PRESIDENT NIXON HAS BEEN TOLD WHILE MINING HARBORS AND
INCREASED BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM HAVE CAUSED GREAT DAMAGE
AND SPREAD TERROR, THEY HAVE NOT CUT OFF HANOI'S SUPPLY LINES
TO FORCES IN THE SOUTH.

FOR EXAMPLE, THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN TOLD THAT SOVIET
AND EASTERN EUROPEAN TANKERS, WHICH PREVIOUSLY RAN IN AND OUT
OF HAIPHONG HARBOR, NOW CALL, INSTEAD, AT CHINESE PORTS AND
THEIR CARGOES ARE SENT INTO NORTH VIETNAM VIA THREE PIPELINES,
THEN PUMPED INTO THE SOUTH, INCLUDING ONE PIPELINE WHICH RUNS
ALL THE WAY INTO THE ASHAU VALLEY.

THIS IS THE BEST JUDGMENT OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY AND THE SEPARATE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. TAD SZULC
OF THE NEW YORK TIMES WAS FIRST IN PRINT WITH PART OF THIS STORY.
WHAT HE HAD, AND THE REST OF IT, CHECKS OUT; SO DO REPORTS THAT
IT IS THE OPINION OF MOST U.S. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS THAT
HANOI IS READY WITH A NEW OFFENSIVE IN THE SOUTH LATE THIS MONTH
OR NEXT, BEFORE THE NOVEMBER ELECTIONS, WHICH, AS POINTED OUT
ON THIS BROADCAST EARLIER IN THE WEEK, IS THE REASON DR. HENRY
KISSINGER IS IN MOSCOW.

*not what
said Kissinger*

BIG INCREASES IN TRADE WITH THE UNITED STATES, AND
DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIA'S NATURAL RESOURCES ARE BEING DANGLED
BY DR. KISSINGER AS BAIT--HE NO DOUBT WOULD PREFER THE WORD
"INCENTIVE"--FOR SOVIET HELP IN ENDING THE WAR. PRESIDENT NIXON,
YOU MAY RECALL, DID SOME OF THIS AT THE MOSCOW SUMMIT IN THE
SPRING. KISSINGER, ON HIS CURRENT TRIP, IS IN EFFECT OFFERING
TO SWEETEN THE POT.

ON THE BASIS OF MORE TRADE, AND WHAT THAT COULD MEAN
TO INCREASING CONSUMER GOODS FOR THE AVERAGE RUSSIAN, AND OTHER
CONSIDERATIONS, KREMLIN LEADERS ARE REPORTED TO HAVE INDICATED

END PAGE ONE

THAT THEY ARE DOING WHAT THEY CAN TO HELP END THE WAR, BUT THEY HAVE GIVEN NO ASSURANCES, ARGUING THAT HANOI, AS ALWAYS, IS TOUGH, INDEPENDENT, PATIENT, AND RESISTS PRESSURE, ESPECIALLY AS LONG AS THIEU REMAINS PRESIDENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM.

PRESIDENT NIXON IS DESCRIBED BY NOT ONE, BUT A NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO HAVE SEEN HIM RECENTLY, AS "ABSOLUTELY DETERMINED TO END THE WAR SOMEHOW BEFORE THE END OF THIS TERM." THAT IS, BY LATE JANUARY. WITH CAUTIONS AGAINST WHAT ALL HIGH ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS CALL EXCESSIVE OPTIMISM IN MIND, IT SHOULD BE MARKED THAT KISSINGER'S MOSCOW TRIP, AND TALK OF INCREASED TRADE RESULTING FROM IT, MUST BE VIEWED FROM THIS OVERALL PERSPECTIVE.

ONE SMALL EXAMPLE: QUESTION: HOW BADLY AND HOW SOON DO THE SOVIETS WANT THEIR VAST OIL AND GAS FIELDS IN SIBERIA DEVELOPED, AND WHAT ARE THEY WILLING TO DO IN THE WAY OF HELPING END THE VIETNAM TRAGEDY TO GET THAT?

NOW BACK TO CONSIDERATION OF HANOI'S BEATING THE BOMBING: AT LEAST THREE, AND PERHAPS FOUR OF PRESIDENT NIXON'S OWN NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE ADVISED HIM AGAINST THE MINING AND HEAVY BOMBING. THAT DECISION HE ANNOUNCED IN MAY. CIA DIRECTOR HELMS, DR. KISSINGER AND ADMIRAL MOORER, CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY JOINT CHIEFS. MOORER RECOMMENDED AGAINST BECAUSE HE DID NOT THINK IT WAS ENOUGH TO BE EFFECTIVE. HELMS AND KISSINGER SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY DIDN'T BELIEVE IT WOULD BE EFFECTIVE.

THE SOURCE ON THIS IS ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, QUOTED BY PETER KARSKY IN TECH, PUBLISHED BY THE MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY. DEFENSE SECRETARY LAIRD MAY ALSO HAVE OPPOSED THE BOMBING AND MINING. EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY IN HIS CASE IS LESS CONCLUSIVE.

THE POINT IS, WITH AT LEAST THREE OF HIS TOP ADVISERS OPPOSED, THE PRESIDENT WENT AHEAD AND GAMBED ON MINING AND BOMBING IN NORTH VIETNAM. MR. NIXON MAY YET PROVE TO BE RIGHT. HE AND WE ARE IN THE PROCESS NOW OF FINDING OUT.

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NNNN

13 September 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Distribution of Agency Publications Possibly Referred
to in 13 September New York Times Article by
Tad Szulc

1. The subject article by Tad Szulc refers to "recent reports" published by the "two principal intelligence agencies" of the U.S. which conclude that Hanoi can sustain the fighting in South Vietnam at the present rate "for the next two years despite the heavy American bombing of North Vietnam."

2. There are only three Agency publications, for whose external distribution SAVA has been responsible, which could conceivably be the CIA report to which Mr. Szulc alludes.

- (a) An 18 July 1972 typescript memorandum, entitled The U.S. Interdiction Campaign in North Vietnam. This memorandum was completed on 18 July, but given no external distribution until 31 July. On that date it was delivered personally by me to Secretary of Defense Laird, at whose request it had been prepared. On the same date, another copy was delivered to Deputy Secretary of Defense Rush. These are the only two copies of this memorandum that went outside the Agency. (These were copy nos. 1 and 2 of report no. TS-200306/72.)

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EXEMPT FROM AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION	
REASON FOR EXEMPTION	
APPROVAL OF DCL	

- (b) An 11 August 1972 printed memorandum, entitled Impact of the U.S. Mining and Bombing Program on North Vietnam. Only three copies of this memorandum were sent outside the Agency; two to Dr. Kissinger and one additional copy to Mr. Phil Odeen. The memorandum was prepared at the specific request of Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Odeen, and its distribution was therefore limited to them alone. (Reference number of this memorandum: TCS-2682/72.)
- (c) A 22 August typescript memorandum, entitled An Assessment of the U.S. Bombing and Mining Campaign in North Vietnam. Attached to this memorandum was a briefer typescript memorandum, entitled Modifications Which Might Enhance the Impact of the U.S. Interdiction Program Against North Vietnam. This set of memoranda, done at the specific request of Dr. Kissinger, was sent in one copy to him and him alone. There was no other external distribution. (The reference numbers of these memoranda were TS-203097/72-A and TS-203097/72-B.)

3. None of the above reports, nor any other Agency issuance of which we are aware, has reached the conclusion that Hanoi can sustain the fighting in South Vietnam at the present rate "for the next two years." We did not, in these reports, look as far as two years into the future, nor did the requesters ask us to do so.

4. Two of the three reports above -- items (a) and (c) -- examined the degree of our success or failure in interdicting or destroying specific target systems in North Vietnam; e.g., the railroads, the highways, the waterways, the POL distribution and storage systems, North Vietnamese industrial installations, etc. These reports did not

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specifically address the question of how long Hanoi could carry on the fighting at the present high level. By implication, however, they indicate that Hanoi's essential military and economic import needs are -- at present -- being met, and that it would be exceedingly difficult to organize an interdiction program which would prevent these needs from being met in the future.

5. The third report, item (b) above, examines the impact of the interdiction program on North Vietnam as of three dates -- early August 1972, 1 October 1972, and 1 January 1973. We were not requested to look beyond the beginning of 1973, and we did not do so. Again, however, one could read into our conclusions the implication that North Vietnam probably will be able to obtain the military and economic imports which it needs to continue the war for a considerable period beyond 1 January 1973. It is possible that Mr. Szulc's informant may have drawn such an implication from this report, assuming he had access to it.

6. In sum, the two-year time frame mentioned in Mr. Szulc's article does not appear in any of our reports. Also, there do not appear to be any verbal echos of any Agency reports' language in the Szulc article. Finally, the three reports discussed above went to a total of four recipients: Kissinger (b and c), Odeen (b only), Laird (a only) and Rush (a only). If one of ours leaked, the leak came from a very high level office.

25X1A9a



25X1A9a Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

O/DCI/SAVA: [redacted] /mee

Distribution

Orig - DCI

1 - ADDI

1 - D/Security

1 - DD/OCI (handcarried by WAC)

1 - VAS/RAC

1 - GAC Chrono

1 - VAS Chrono

1 - WAC ✓

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VIETNAMESE AFFAIRS STAFF

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DATE: 14 Sept 72

TO: Mr. Howard Osborn
Director of Security

FROM:

SUBJECT:

REMARKS:

1. One of your associates (Mr. O'Brien in the Special Center) called me this morning (14 September) with reference to the 13 September New York Times article by Tad Szulc. I explained in general terms why we felt that if Mr. Szulc had in fact seen an Agency report, the leak of the Agency document would have had to come from a very high level, but that none of the language in Mr. Szulc's article actually reflected any of the language or precise argumentation used in any recent Agency memoranda.

2. In point of fact, there are three possible candidates for the alleged "Agency report" referred to by Mr. Szulc. Each of these is itself a very sensitive document, knowledge of whose existence should not be excessively bruited about. I am, therefore, sending you on an eyes only basis the attached copy of my note to the Director on this matter.

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Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachment

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13 SEP 1972

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Hanoi Held Able to Fight 2 Years at 'Present Rate'

CPYRGHT

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 12—This country's two principal intelligence agencies have concluded in recent reports submitted to the White House that Hanoi can sustain the fighting in South Vietnam "at the present rate" for the next two years despite the heavy American bombing of North Vietnam.

In separate but concurring reports prepared late last month, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency declared that although the heavy bombing in the North since last April had been successful in hitting designated targets, it had failed to meaningfully slow the flow of men and equipment to South Vietnam.

A high-ranking intelligence official, along with others interviewed this week, said, however, that if the North had not been heavily bombed, the North Vietnamese could have doubled their operations and would have been spared heavy losses.

"They have not been hit fatally," he said, "but they are slowly bleeding to death—even if it takes two more years."

The two intelligence agencies said in their reports, which were prepared for the National Security Council, that the overall results of the bombing to date have been disappointing because of North Vietnamese "ant tactics" in keeping troops and supplies moving despite the air attacks. The substance of the reports was made available to The New York Times today by highly placed intelligence officials.

These officials, citing daily intelligence estimates as well as the bombing reports, said that all the indications were that the Communists were preparing new "high-point" offensives throughout South Vietnam within 30 days.

Following are the highlights of the current intelligence estimates made available by the intelligence officials:

Some 20,000 fresh North Vietnamese troops have infiltrated into South Vietnam in the last six weeks, making an approximate total of 100,000 regular soldiers there. Only one training brigade is said to remain in North Vietnam.

The North Vietnamese now have the highest number of regular troops in the Mekong River delta, southwest of Saigon, since the start of the war. The total was estimated at 20,000 to 30,000 men compared with 3,000 a year ago. Most of the infiltration has occurred since the start of the Communist offensive March 30—and intelligence officials said that the delta now was "our biggest problem," as pacification programs had become seriously threatened.

A third petroleum pipeline has been completed between the Chinese frontier railroad terminal of Pingsiang and Hanoi. The work began in May, after the United States mined Haiphong harbor, but the completion of the third pipeline became known only in recent days.

The North Vietnamese have built additional pipelines southward from Hanoi to supply their forces in South Vietnam. One of them reaches down to the Ashau Valley.

Intelligence officials, discussing the reports of the two agencies, said that it was virtually impossible for air strikes to cut the pipelines, which are four inches in diameter. Two officials said that whenever a pipeline was hit, North Vietnamese technicians turned it off at pumping stations while rapid repairs were made.

As for railways from China, they said, the North Vietnamese have to a large extent neutralized the effects of the bombing by marshaling all available rolling stock and manpower.

The officials said that the North Vietnamese "ant tactics" involved moving supplies by rail up to a bombed-out bridge or a severed highway. The supplies are then reportedly moved by river barges, truck, bicycle or back pack to railroad cars waiting beyond a damaged section of the track or a destroyed bridge. At the same time, it was noted, labor units repair the tracks and bridges.

'Officials' Conclusions

The conclusion reached by the intelligence agencies, officials said, was that the "ant tactics" used in the movement of supplies and the three underground pipelines had enabled the North Vietnamese to keep their forces fighting.

They said that frequent pilots' reports of "secondary explosions" along the infiltration trails and the capture of arms and munitions caches—a 143-ton cache was reported found by South Vietnamese troops last week—suggested that material continued moving southward.

The "secondary explosions" are said to indicate that munitions depots or loaded trucks have been hit while other targets have been under attack.

The officials said the predictions of new enemy offensives during September and October were based on the deployment of troops southward, the "preparation of battlefields" by demolition and other new technical units, captured documents and information from defectors and prisoners of war.

These officials emphasized what they termed "a major effort" by the Communists to bring troops and supplies into the Mekong Delta through Cambodia's Chup plantation area, the so-called Parrot's beak area of Cambodia, which juts into South Vietnam west of Saigon, and Route 1, the main highway from Saigon to Phnompenh, Cambodia.

United States intelligence estimates are that since the start of the Communist offensive at the end of March in the northern part of South Vietnam, the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong have lost 100,000 dead on the battlefield and in bombing attacks. The South Vietnamese toll is put at 25,000 to 30,000.

But intelligence officials emphasized that both sides had suffered equal "qualitative" losses in officers and noncommissioned officers.

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17 September 1972

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

[REDACTED] A

SUBJECT: The Dan Rather Broadcast

1. Attached is a transcript of the Dan Rather broadcast that Mr. Young from the White House was so excited about on Saturday. (Note that contrary to what he said, it happened on Friday, not Saturday.) Note also that Rather did not say--as Young told us--that Kissinger's trip to Moscow was made because of the lack of success of the bombing effort. What he said was that the prospect of a new offensive is what caused Henry's junket.
2. It is interesting also that Rather takes off from Szulc's story, which Young also did not mention.
3. I think I will have to tell the Director about this little passage at arms as soon as convenient for him on Monday morning.
4. I believe Ed Proctor should also be at the meeting with the DCI.

25X1A9a

[REDACTED]

AD/DCI/IC

Attachment

cc: DD/I

SAVA received copies 1-10

Copies 1 & 2 : To Kissinger

Copies 3 - 7 : Here in file

Copy 8 : VAS/RAC

Copy 9 : General Walters

Copy 10 : Phil Odeen